ibps-so 2019 · Question 155 of 300

A joint account was opened at a branch by the members of one family, whose particulars were recorded at the time of veri cation as follows. Q is the son of R. R is the sister of S. S is married to T. T is the father of U. How is U related to Q?

1. ABrother
2. BCousinCorrect
3. CNephew
4. DUncle
5. ESon Directions (Q110–Q120) : The passage reproduced below is taken from a commentary upon the law of data protection, a subject upon which every o cer of a bank is now required to have an informed opinion, since the institution he serves is at once a large collector of personal records and a party answerable for the safe keeping of them. Read the passage given below with care and answer the questions that follow it. Certain words have been printed in bold in order to help you to locate them while answering some of the questions. Some of the questions turn upon what the author has actually stated and some upon what may fairly be inferred from what he has stated; your answer in every case is to rest upon the passage alone and not upon any knowledge of the subject that you may bring to it from elsewhere. Privacy is an awkward word for what data protection law is actually about. It suggests concealment, and a citizen who believes he has nothing to conceal may think the argument does not concern him. The more exact description is control: who may collect a record of what a person does, how long it may be kept, to what further uses it may be put, and who settles those questions. Framed so, the matter ceases to be the private anxiety of the secretive and becomes an ordinary question of power. The di culty begins with the economics. Personal data are cheap to gather, cost almost nothing to copy, and grow more valuable the more of them are held together. A single record of a journey is worth little; a year of them describes a life. Firms therefore face a standing incentive to collect more than a service requires, and to keep what they hold long after its purpose is served. Consent, the instrument upon which most statutes rely, is a feeble check upon that incentive. A notice that nobody reads, presented at the moment when the user wants something else, and drafted by the very party that gains from agreement, is not a meaningful act of choice; it is a formality that shifts responsibility to the person least able to bear it. A second di culty is that the harm is di use and delayed. The person whose premium rises, whose application is quietly ranked lower, or whose neighbourhood is policed more heavily seldom learns which inference produced the result, still less which disclosure made it possible. Where injury cannot be attributed, the ordinary machinery of complaint does not operate, and regulation must work in advance of the harm rather than after it. This is why the more thoughtful statutes have moved away from consent and towards obligation. Limitation of purpose, minimisation, a duty to delete, a duty to explain an automated decision, and a liability that attaches to the holder of the data rather than to the person described by them: each places the burden where the knowledge and the pro t already lie. Enforcement, however, requires a regulator with technical sta , with independence from the government of the day, and with the appetite to ne a large rm, and it is upon this unglamorous point that most regimes founder. None of this argues for treating data as untouchable. Aggregated records have improved epidemiology, transport planning, and the assessment of credit for those without collateral. The question is not whether such records are used but upon whose terms; and a settlement whose terms are written by the party with the most to gain is no settlement at all.